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income dispersion. By reducing the risk faced by entrepreneurs, it reduces income
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1 Introduction
The literature on institutions, law and economics has shown that investor protection a¤ects
signicantly the nancial structure of an economy, and has investigated the e¤ects of
nancial development on economic performance in terms of GDP growth, productivity
and investment.1 What has not been recognized is that investor protection, through
its e¤ect on nancial structure and the allocation of risk, may inuence the risk taking
behavior of investors and rms, thereby a¤ecting income inequality. To ll this gap,
this paper investigates the link between investor protection and income inequality, both
theoretically and empirically. It proposes a model where investor protection promotes risk
sharing between nanciers and entrepreneurs, thereby inducing more risk taking in the
economy. Better risk sharing and wider risk taking, in turn, a¤ect income inequality in
opposite ways. The main results of the model are then confronted with the data.
To formalize these ideas, I construct a simple model of investors and entrepreneurs
where agents are risk averse and heterogeneous in ability. Investors decide how to allocate
their endowment between safe loans and diversied portfolios of risky assets, while entre-
preneurs face a choice between a safe and a risky technology, whose probability of success
depends on ability. Starting up a rm entails a xed entry cost that entrepreneurs must
cover by borrowing. Financial markets are subject to a moral hazard problem arising
from the non-observability of output to nanciers. Measures of investor protection can be
adopted to alleviate the nancial friction. In particular, I assume that investor protection
promotes transparency by imposing a proportional cost to misreport cash ow.2 For in-
stance, this cost can be thought of as the additional honorary an auditor would charge to
certify a falsied book or to design nancial operations to hide revenues from outside -
nanciers. Financial contracts are designed to be optimal and incentive compatible. Better
guarantees generate more condence among investors, thereby making them more willing
to insure the entrepreneurs through lending. It follows that nancial systems with stronger
investor protection provide entrepreneurs with a higher degree of risk sharing. Finally, I
rule out wealth heterogeneity among agents, so that all inequality is due to idiosyncratic
factors (ability), nancial market conditions and income risk.3
In the model, better investor protection a¤ects income inequality in two ways. (i)
1See, among others, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), La Porta et al. (1997) and (2006), Beck and Levine
(2004), Levine (2005) and references therein.
2 Investor protection takes the form of a hiding cost also in Aghion et al. (2005), Castro et al. (2004)
and Lacker and Weinberg (1989). In this paper, like in the two latter, the cost is proportional to the
hidden amount, while in the rst, it equals a fraction of the initial investment.
3As shown in Hurst and Lusardi (2004), wealth may not be the key factor a¤ecting entrepreneurial
choices. Abstracting from wealth heterogeneity allows me to better focus on other determinants, such as
risk and ability.
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It improves risk sharing, thereby reducing income volatility for a given mass of agents
operating the risky technology; and (ii) it raises the share of entrepreneurs choosing the
risky option, and therefore being exposed to earning risk. While (i) tends to reduce
inequality, (ii) raises it. It can be shown that the risk takinge¤ect (ii) dominates when
investor protection is low since risky entrepreneurs still face a considerable earnings risk,
while the risk sharing e¤ect (i) prevails when investor protection is high since better
insurance applies to a large mass of risky entrepreneurs. Hence, the relationship between
investor protection and income inequality is predicted to be non-monotonic.
To evaluate empirically the main results of the model, I consider a panel of forty-
ve countries observed between 1976 and 2000. The choice of a cross-country analysis is
dictated by the fact that investor protection is generally set by law and hence exhibits very
little within-country variation. I evaluate the risk sharingand risk takinge¤ects of
investor protection rst by controlling separately for investor protection and a proxy of risk
taking. Next, I also control for the interaction between these variables. A major challenge
of the empirical part is to nd appropriate measures of the relevant variables. I proxy
inequality with the Gini coe¢ cient of the income distribution and investor protection
with de jure indexes compiled by La Porta et al. (2006). While de jure indicators of
investor protection are available and widely used, entrepreneurial risk taking is di¢ cult
to quantify. It was shown by the corporate nance literature that a rm relying more on
external equity relative to debt nance is in a better position to embark in risky projects
such as innovation (see for instance Brown et al., 2009). Therefore, I proxy risk taking with
the ratio between stock market capitalization and credit to the private sector. The results
suggest that indeed investor protection promotes risk taking, which in turn raises income
inequality. Income dispersion, on the other hand, tends to fall with investor protection to
the extent that this is not accompanied by more risk taking. This evidence lends support
to the main theoretical predictions.
The contribution of this paper is related to four main strands of literature. Acemoglu
and Johnson (2005), as well as La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999, 2006), show that investor
protection, and in general institutions aimed at contracting protection, a¤ect the nancial
structure of an economy by promoting the development of stock markets, but have unclear
e¤ects on economic performance. No attention was devoted, however, to study the e¤ects
on inequality.
A recent literature on the macroeconomic implications of entrepreneurship addresses
the e¤ects of nancial frictions on investment, growth and wealth concentration through
their impact on entrepreneurial choices (see Quadrini, 2010 for a review). A series of
papers suggest that the existence of nancial frictions allows only the wealthiest agents
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to become entrepreneurs and induces them to save more in order to overcome the credit
constraint and enlarge the rm in the future. This implies that wealth tends to become
more concentrated (i.e., higher inequality) the more severe the nancial friction. Aggregate
capital accumulation may be slowed down due to imperfect risk sharing. The overall e¤ect
on growth may be ambiguous, and depend for instance on capital mobility, as in Castro et
al. (2004). Caselli and Gennaioli (2005) show that weak contract enforcement deteriorates
productivity (TFP) by discouraging untalented family-rm owners from hiring competent
managers (as in Burkart et al., 2003). Michelacci and Schivardi (2010) show that, if rms
cannot diversify away their idiosyncratic risk due to nancial frictions, there is less risk
taking and this has negative e¤ects on growth. While some of these studies have considered
the impact on inequality, they focus mainly on how nancial frictions interact with initial
wealth inequality in a¤ecting entrepreneurial choices and in shaping the evolution of wealth
distribution.
Theoretical contributions by Aghion and Bolton (1997), Banerjee and Newman (1993),
Galor and Zeira (1993), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), and Piketty (1997), among
others, have proposed explanations for the relationship between nancial development,
inequality and growth. In most of these models, income inequality originates from het-
erogeneity in the initial wealth distribution, paired with credit market frictions. As the
poorest are subject to credit constraints, they are prevented from making e¢ cient invest-
ments in the most productive activities.4 Over time, capital accumulation determines the
dynamics of wealth and income. I depart from this approach in two main respects. First,
the nancial friction a¤ects the share of risk borne by agents, rather than the amount of
external nance available to them. Second, I consider a di¤erent source of ex-ante hetero-
geneity (entrepreneurial ability), and propose a new mechanism translating di¤erences in
ability into income inequality that is independent of wealth accumulation. In the present
paper, heterogeneity in productivity, the extent of risk sharing and the size of the risky
sector ultimately determine the income distribution.5 The implication is that, by promot-
ing risk taking, better nancial institutions can amplify inequality. This novel prediction
is supported by the empirical evidence in the paper.
The vast empirical literature on nancial development and economic performance (see
Levine, 2005 and references therein) provides evidence that deeper nancial markets foster
growth. Very little attention was paid to the e¤ects of nancial development on income
4The credit constraint can derive from the non-observability of physical output as in Banerjee and
Newman (1992) and Galor and Zeira (1993), or e¤ort as in Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Piketty (1997).
5Similarly to this paper, in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999) income inequality is generated by managerial
incentives. Antunes et al. (2008) propose a quantitative model with heterogeneity in wealth and ability
where weak nancial institutions hinder growth and raise income inequality. Yet, both papers abstract
from rm-specic idiosyncratic risk.
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inequality. Two recent contributions (see Clarke et al., 2006 and Beck et al., 2007) show
that higher availability of credit to the private sector, tends to reduce income inequality.
My results are consistent with this evidence, but also provide a novel insight suggesting
that equity-like nance, promoting risk taking, may actually increase inequality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
of entrepreneurial choice and shows how earnings and the degree of risk taking vary in
equilibrium with investor protection. In section 3, I characterize analytically and by means
of numerical solution how income inequality responds to changes in investor protection
and the degree of risk taking. Section 4 provides empirical evidence from a panel of forty-
ve countries over the period 1976-2000 supporting the main results of the model. Section
5 concludes.
2 The model
In this section, I propose a simple static model where risk-averse agents, heterogeneous
in their entrepreneurial ability, have to choose between safe and risky projects and need
external nance. Asymmetric information in the nancial market generates a moral hazard
problem that makes it too costly for some entrepreneurs to nance risky projects. Investor
protection may alleviate moral hazard, thereby easing the conditions of access to nance
and promoting both risk sharing and risk taking.
2.1 Set up
Consider a small open economy populated by a continuum of risk-averse agents whose
preferences are represented by
V = E [u (c)] ;
where E is the expectation operator, c is consumption of a homogeneous good, and the
utility function satises the following properties: u0 > 0, u00 < 0 and limc!0 u0 (c) =1.
Agents are heterogeneous in their ability, denoted by  2 [0; 1], drawn from a contin-
uously di¤erentiable distribution G (), but have no wealth endowment. They work as
self-employed entrepreneurs and can choose to produce the consumption good using either
a safe or a risky technology. Their consumption may be heterogeneous and depend on
individual ability and technological choice. Capital needed for production may be raised
on the international nancial market, where a risk-free asset yielding a gross return r is
traded, along with risky assets that will be described later. The price of the consumption
good and the safe interest rate are determined on the world market and are assumed to
be constant and normalized to 1.
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2.1.1 Technology
Each entrepreneur with ability  can choose between a safe and a risky technology. The
former generates a constant level of production which is independent of ability:
yS () = yS = B.
The performance of rms using the risky technology depends on entrepreneurial ability.6
For simplicity, and without much loss of generality, I assume that ability only a¤ects the
probability of success and not the quantities produced.7 In particular, an entrepreneur
with ability , generates output
y () =
(
yH = A with probability 
yL = 'A with probability 1  
where ' 2 (0; 1) and yH and yL denote production in the good and bad state respectively.
This implies that a rms expected cash ow is [+ (1  )']A, which is increasing in
ability. Success is i.i.d. within each ability group, hence there is no aggregate risk and
total production of entrepreneurs with ability  equals g () [+ (1  )']A. Moreover,
I assume that, regardless of their technological choice, entrepreneurs have to pay a xed
entry cost of 1 that can be covered by raising funds on the international nancial market.
2.1.2 Financial market
I assume that investors in the international nancial market are atomistic and risk-averse,
and have perfect information about the risk-free interest rate (r = 1), production technolo-
gies (B, A and '), the individual ability of each entrepreneur () and her technological
choice, but cannot observe nal output (y).
The nancial contract entails the (credible) commitment of the rm to repay after
production a certain amount, possibly contingent on the realization of output that is
reported. Since production functions and technological choices are public information,
entrepreneurs using the safe technology are known to generate with certainty a cash ow
of B and thus face a x repayment equal to the international gross risk-free rate, 1, which
6See Schiller and Crewson (1997), and Fairly and Robb (2003) for empirical studies on the determinants
of entrepreneurial success, mainly among small rms.
7Ability can be considered as playing a twofold role. It enhances the chance of succeeding in risky
enterprises, as assumed in the model. But it may also raise productivity regardless of the technological
choice. Introducing this second e¤ect into the model would not a¤ect the results.
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gives them a payo¤ of
wS = B   1:
The situation is di¤erent if the borrower runs a risky project. Once production has oc-
curred, an unlucky entrepreneur can only report output yL = 'A, and hence repay to
investors the cash ow minus her earnings: yL  wL (). If successful, the entrepreneur
may misreport the output realization and pretend to be in the bad state, in order to
repay yL  wL () instead of yH  wH (). However, I assume that measures of investor
protection, specic to the borrowers country, make misreporting costly. For every unit of
hidden cash ow, the rm incurs a cost p 2 [0; 1], so that the payo¤ from misreporting is
wL ()+ (1  p)  yH   yL. Truth-telling is rational as long as its value is at least equal
to that of misreporting. Therefore, the nancial contract

wH () ; wL ()
	
must satisfy
the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint:
u
 
wH ()
  u  wL () + (1  p)  yH   yL : (IC)
Financial contracts are set to maximize the entrepreneurs expected utility, V R (),
subject to the IC constraint and the outsidersparticipation constraint. The latter requires
that investors be indi¤erent between lending to all entrepreneurs with ability , and buying
the risk-free asset.8 Thus, the payo¤s from the risky choice are determined as the solution
to the optimal nancial contract problem:
max
wH();wL()
V R ()  u  wH ()+ (1  )u  wL () ; (P1)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint:
u
 
wH ()
  u  wL () + (1  p) (1  ')A ; (IC)
and investorsparticipation constraint:

 
A  wH ()+ (1  )  'A  wL () = 1: (PC)
Note that a pooled portfolio of loans to the i.i.d. entrepreneurs with ability  yields the
LHS of (PC) with certainty, so that investors face no uncertainty.9
8See Castro et al. (2004) for a similar way of modelling the optimal nancial contact.
9 It follows that the participation constraint is the same as in the case of competitive, risk-neutral
nanciers with a single borrower with ability .
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2.1.3 Equilibrium
Each entrepreneur with ability  has rational expectations and chooses technology (safe
or risky) to maximize her expected utility:
max
T2fS;Rg
V T () ; (P2)
where
V S () = u
 
wS

V R () = u
 
wH ()

+ (1  i)u
 
wH ()

:
In other words, every entrepreneur chooses technology, given her individual ability  and
the optimal nancial contract fwH () ; wL ()g which solves (P1).
Denition Given the cost of misreporting, p, the equilibrium for this small open econ-
omy is dened as the set of technological choices and nancial contracts fT () ; wH () ;
wL ()
	
2[0;1], such that each agent with ability  solves (P2), with payo¤s solving (P1)
subject to (IC) and (PC).
For simplicity, I assume that 'A < B < A which implies that the risky technology is
on average more productive than the safe one for some entrepreneurs.
2.2 Solution
To solve for the optimal technological choice (P2), entrepreneurs need to know the payo¤s
from the risky project, determined by the optimal nancial contract fwH () ; wL ()g2[0;1].
Therefore, I proceed backwards and start by solving problem (P1) subject to (IC) and
(PC). I rst obtain the optimal contract under e¢ cient markets (with no information
asymmetry) and then compute the optimal payo¤s in the presence of asymmetric infor-
mation for a given level of investor protection. Next, I characterize technological choice
fT ()g2[0;1], given the optimal payo¤s. Finally, I show how the equilibrium varies with
the degree of investor protection.
2.2.1 Optimal nancial contract: e¢ cient markets
If investor could perfectly observe the cash ow of a rm, misreporting would be impossi-
ble, and hence the optimal nancial contract would simply maximize the expected utility
of a risk-averse borrower with success probability  (P1) subject to the participation con-
straint of a perfectly diversied lender (PC). Thus, investors would provide entrepreneurs
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with full insurance in exchange for an expected gross return equal to the safe rate, as
analytically shown in the rst order conditions:
u0
 
wH ()

= u0
 
wL ()

= u0
 
wFB ()

wFB () = A+ (1  )'A  1;
where u0 is the rst derivative of u and wFB () denotes the e¢ cient, rst-best, payo¤ of
a risky entrepreneur with ability , which is equal to her expected cash ow, increasing
in ability, minus the risk-free interest rate repayment.
2.2.2 Optimal nancial contract: Asymmetric information
If the cash ow cannot be observed by outsiders, entrepreneurs may have an incentive
to misreport, and hence the optimal nancial contract must also satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraint (IC). The rst-best contract solves (P1) subject to (IC) and
(PC) only if investor protection drives the gain from misreporting down to zero, which
happens only for p = 1. This means that when investor protection is perfect (p = 1),
outside nanciers can behave as if they were perfectly informed, and thus fully insure
entrepreneurs without inducing them to misreport.
If investor protection is not perfect (0  p < 1), rst-best state-invariant earnings are
not incentive compatible since wFB () < wFB ()+ (1  p) (1  ')A and entrepreneurs
in the good state would be tempted to misreport their cash ow realization. Due to risk
aversion, agents want to minimize the di¤erence between the marginal utilities in the two
states, u0
 
wH ()
 u0  wL (). The combination of wH () and wL () that achieves this
goal and complies with incentive compatibility is the one satisfying (IC 0) with equality.
Investorsparticipation constraint (PC) needs also hold with equality, so that the optimal
nancial contract satises the following rst order conditions:
wH () = wL () + (1  p) (1  ')A; (1)
wL () = 'A  1 + p (1  ')A; (2)
u0
 
wH ()

< u0
 
wL ()

:
2.2.3 Technological choice
Entrepreneurs with ability  will choose the risky technology if it gives at least the same
expected utility as the safe project:
T () = R() V R ()  V S :
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Since the state-contingent payo¤s of a risky entrepreneur, wH () and wL () in equations
(1) and (2), increase with ability (), while the di¤erence between them is independent
of it, her expected utility, V R, is also increasing with ability. Expected utility of a safe
entrepreneur, instead, is constant and does not depend on ability. This implies that the
solution to the technological choice problem (P2) features a threshold ability level  such
that the agents with ability higher than  choose the risky technology while those with
lower ability choose the safe project. This property is formalized in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 There exists a unique  such that 8  ; u  wH ()+(1  )u  wL () 
u(wS)); and

wH () ; wL ()
	
is the solution to (P1) subject to (IC 0) and (PC): Proof.
See the Appendix.
Note that, due to risk aversion, the expected payo¤ of risky entrepreneurs with abil-
ity equal to the threshold, wH ()+ (1  )wL (), must be higher than the safe
earnings, wS .
2.2.4 Investor protection and the equilibrium
To study how investor protection a¤ects the equilibrium of the model, I rst focus on the
optimal nancial contract and then on technological choice. The optimal payo¤s of risky
entrepreneurs can be conveniently re-written as
wH () = wFB () + (1  ) (1  p) (1  ')A
wL () = wFB ()   (1  p) (1  ')A:
The rst component, wFB (), represents the payo¤ of a risky entrepreneur with ability
 under perfect investor protection (p = 1). The second term is the adjustment that
investors have to set to induce truth-telling, which is state contingent and varies with
ability and investor protection. This term is positive in the good and negative in the bad
state to o¤set the temptation of an entrepreneur to misreport cash ow. It is decreasing
in p because when the unit cost of hiding cash ow is high, the temptation to misreport is
low and hence a smaller deviation from the rst best is enough to achieve truth-telling. It
follows that also the wedge between state-contingent earnings, wH () wL (), measuring
the price that entrepreneurs have to pay for the temptation to misreport, is decreasing
in investor protection. Moreover, since more skilled entrepreneurs are more likely to be
in the good state, and hence to be tempted to hide cash ow, higher ability implies
lower payo¤s in both states relative to the e¢ cient case, as long as investor protection
is not perfect. Overall, both wH () and wL () are increasing in entrepreneurial ability,
10
as clearly suggested by equations (1) and (2). Finally, notice that for p = 0, implying a
constant repayment equal to the risk-free rate, the entire risk is borne by the entrepreneur.
Expected earnings of a risky entrepreneur with ability ,
E [w j ] = [ (1  ') + ']A  1;
are equal to the rst best payo¤, wFB (), and do not vary with investor protection. Her
expected utility, due to risk aversion, falls when the di¤erence between state-contingent
earnings grows. Therefore, a rise in p, by reducing the gap between wH () and wL (),
increases the expected utility of risky entrepreneurs, V R.
Since equilibrium earnings are functions of investor protection and the technological
parameters, also the threshold ability  varies with p, A, ' and B, as formalized in
Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 The threshold ability  is a decreasing function of investor protection (p)
and technological level of the risky sector (A); it increases with the riskiness of the risky
technology (inverse of ') and the productivity of the safe one (B):
@
@p
< 0;
@
@A
< 0;
@
@'
< 0;
@
@B
> 0
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, stronger investor protection allows entrepreneurs to better share risks with
investors, thereby raising the expected utility drawn from the risky project. Since payo¤s
and hence V R are increasing in ability, a rise in p makes the risky technology preferable
to the most able among safe entrepreneurs, i.e. reduces threshold ability . A higher A
implies that productivity of the risky project increases, and more so in the good state. As
a consequence, payo¤s rise but also the wedge between them. Since the overall e¤ect on
expected utility is positive, a more productive technology reduces the threshold ability for
risky entrepreneurship. The parameter ' captures the riskiness of the risky technology
(maximum risk for ' = 0, no risk for ' = 1), and also a¤ects its expected productivity. If
it grows, it makes the risky option preferable to the most able among safe entrepreneurs
because it reduces the volatility of state-contingent earnings and increases their expected
value, thereby raising expected utility. Trivially, higher productivity in the safe industry,
B, makes it more attractive, thereby inducing the least able among risky entrepreneurs to
adopt the safe technology, which rises the threshold .
The threshold also depends on risk aversion, since the curvature of the utility function
a¤ects expected utility for given probability of success (, i.e., ability). For instance, with
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logaritmic utility, the risky technology is not run in equilibrium ( = 1) as long as the
earnings of the most able in the bad state are non positive, i.e., for p  (1  'A) =[(1 
')A], which is positive for 'A < 1. Alternatively, when risk aversion is su¢ ciently low,
there may be entrepreneurs choosing the risky project even in the absence of investor
protection ( (0) = max < 1).
In the case of perfect investor protection (p = 1), the risky technology gives higher ex-
pected utility than the safe one whenever its expected productivity is higher: [ + (1  )']A
 B. Therefore, it is easy to derive a closed form solution for the threshold ability,
p=1 =
B   'A
(1  ')A;
and verify that it lies in the support of  under the hypothesis that 'A < B < A.
In the general case of imperfect investor protection (0  p < 1), the expression for the
threshold is more involved. However, payo¤s are easily derived as:
w () =
8>><>>:
wS with probability 1 for  < 
wH () with probability  for   
wL () with probability 1   for   
where wH () and wL () are given by (1) and (2). Henceforth, I denote the threshold
abilities associated with p = 1 and 0  p < 1 by p=1 and p<1, respectively. For p = 1,
perfect risk sharing is achieved through the optimal nancial contract, so that the whole
payo¤ schedule w () is state independent and exhibits no jump at the threshold ability.
When 0  p < 1, the earnings of risky entrepreneurs are state contingent and hence, due
to risk aversion, at  = p<1 their expected value needs to be higher than the safe wage.
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium ability-earnings proles. If there is perfect investor
protection, p = 1, income of entrepreneurs is described by the solid line. It is at and
equal to wS for the less able, who run the safe project, and proportional to ability for the
more talented ones, who run the risky project. Due to perfect risk sharing, earnings are
constant across states. If investor protection drops to 0  p < 1 (dashed line), nancing
a risky rm becomes more costly, thereby inducing the least able among entrepreneurs
to shift to the safe technology. Graphically, (1) the mass of risky rms shrinks, i.e., the
at segment of the earnings prole becomes longer. I dene this as the risk taking
e¤ect. (2) Earnings become state contingent, and the wedge between wHp<1 and w
L
p<1
widens as p falls due to worse risk sharing. I call this the risk sharinge¤ect. The fact
that imperfect insurance reduces expected utility of risky entrepreneurs is captured by the
jump in expected earnings at the threshold p<1.
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B-1
p*p<1
w(p)
p1
wHp<1
wLp<1
p(1-j) A
wp=1
(1-j) A
A-1
p*p=1
Figure 1: Ability and Earnings in Equilibrium.
The mass of entrepreneurs choosing the risky project represents the degree of risk
taking in the economy and is analytically characterized as
  1 G () ;
which is proven to be decreasing in the threshold ability and increasing in investor pro-
tection, and to vary with technological parameters.
Corollary 1 Risk taking () is decreasing in the threshold ability (), the riskiness of
the risky technology (inverse of ') and the productivity of the safe one (B):
@
@
 0; @
@'
 0; @
@B
 0;
it is increasing in investor protection (p) and technological level of the risky sector (A):
@
@p
 0; @
@A
 0:
Proof. See the Appendix.
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3 Evaluating income distribution
In this section, I study how investor protection a¤ects income inequality. I rst take as a
simple measure of income inequality the ratio between the highest and the lowest realiza-
tions of earnings, and characterize analytically how it varies with investor protection due
to the risk taking and risk sharing e¤ects. Next, I consider measures of inequality
accounting for the entire distribution of income such as the variance and the Gini coef-
cient, and show analytically and by means of numerical solution how these respond to
changes in investor protection.
I denote with ! the ratio between top and bottom earnings:
! =
wmax
wmin
:
Trivially, if no risky project is run, all agents earn wS with certainty and there is no
inequality, so that ! = 1. In the general case, when both technologies are used, wmin
is earned by the least able among risky entrepreneurs, as wL () is lower than or equal
to wH () for any  and increasing in ability. Since these agents draw the same ex-
pected utility from both projects, u
 
wH ()

+ (1  )u  wL () = u(wS), it must
be that u
 
wL ()
  u(wS), which implies, by monotonicity of the utility function, that
wL ()  wS . The highest realization of earnings belongs to the most able entrepreneurs,
wmax = wH (1) = A  1. Hence, the general expression for ! is
! =
A  1
'A  1 + p (1  ')A:
For given threshold ability, an increase in investor protection improves risk sharing thereby
raising the earnings of unlucky entrepreneurs and reducing the ratio of top to bottom
earnings. For given investor protection, an increase in the threshold ability (e.g., due to
higher risk aversion), corresponding to a drop in risk taking, implies that the least able
among risky entrepreneurs have higher ability and hence face higher earnings (recall that
both wH and wL are increasing in ). This means that inequality falls with threshold
ability and increases with risk taking, as formalized in Proposition 1 and Corollary 2.
Proposition 1 For a given threshold ability of risky entrepreneurs, , better investor
protection reduces the ratio of top to bottom earnings:
@!
@p


 0;
for a given level of investor protection, p, an increase in the threshold ability of risky
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entrepreneurs reduces the ratio of top to bottom earnings:
@!
@

p
 0:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 2 For a given degree of risk taking, , better investor protection reduces the
ratio of top to bottom earnings:
@!
@p


 0;
for given ability distribution, G, and level of investor protection, p, an increase in the
degree of risk taking increases the ratio of top to bottom earnings:
@!
@

p
 0:
Proof. See the Appendix.
An alternative measure of inequality that takes into account the entire income distri-
bution is the variance of the earnings realizations:
V ar (w) = G ()

wS   E [w]2 + Z 1


 
wH ()  E [w]2 g () d (3)
+
Z 1

(1  )  wL ()  E [w]2 g () d;
where
E [w] = G ()wS +
Z 1

E [w j ] g () d
is the average income in the economy. Lemma 3 proves E [w] to be increasing in investor
protection.
Lemma 3 Average entrepreneurial earnings, E [w], are increasing in investor protection,
p.
dE [w]
dp
 0:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, an increase in the cost of misreporting, p, gives risky entrepreneurs better
insurance, thereby encouraging more agents to choose the risky technology (i.e., a drop
in the threshold ability, ). Risk aversion requires that these marginal entrepreneurs,
with mass g (), enjoy higher expected earnings when switching from the safe to the
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risky sector, and thus they contribute to increase average income. This implies that also
aggregate production and welfare increase with investor protection, and this e¤ect is driven
by risk taking.
Equation (3) for the variance of earnings suggests that better investor protection af-
fects inequality both through the risk sharingand the risk takinge¤ect: by the former,
it closes the wedge between state-contingent earnings of entrepreneurs, thereby reducing
income di¤erentials among agents with the same ability,   , and hence overall in-
equality. Analytically, holding  constant, a rise in p reduces the terms under integration
in (3). This e¤ect is more pronounced the larger the mass of risky entrepreneurs,  = 1
 G () (i.e., the lower the threshold ability), as formalized and proved in Proposition 2
and Corollary 3. For given investor protection, however, a drop in the threshold ability 
implies that a mass g () of agents switches to state-contingent earnings, which is likely
to translate into higher inequality.
Proposition 2 For a given threshold ability of risky entrepreneurs, , better investor
protection reduces the variance of the earnings distribution:
@V ar
@p


 0;
better investor protection reduces inequality more where the threshold is lower:
@V ar
@p

=1
<
@V ar
@p

=2
; for any 1 < 

2:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 3 For a given degree of risk taking, , better investor protection reduces the
variance of the earnings distribution:
@V ar
@p


 0;
for given ability distribution, G, better investor protection reduces inequality more where
there is more risk taking,  = 1 G ():
@V ar
@p

=1
<
@V ar
@p

=2
; for any 1 > 2:
Proof. See the Appendix.
The overall impact of investor protection on income inequality depends on the strength
of the risk sharingand risk takinge¤ects. In particular, when the cost of misreporting,
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and hence the size of the risky sector, is close to its maximum, the risk takinge¤ect is
weak, since the marginal entrepreneurs do not add much to the existing mass of risky rms.
The risk sharinge¤ect is instead very strong since it applies to nearly all potential risky
entrepreneurs, and hence an increase in p reduces inequality. When investor protection is
very low, there is a small mass of risky rms in the economy and hence the risk taking
e¤ect is strong at the margin, while the risk sharinge¤ect is weak since it applies to few
entrepreneurs. It follows that an improvement in investor protection when this is already
high is likely to reduce inequality, while it increases it when p is low. The smaller the
share of risky entrepreneurs in presence of low investor protection - e.g., due to high risk
aversion, technological risk (low ') or right skewness of the ability distribution - the wider
the range of p for which income inequality is increasing in investor protection.
Although intuitive, the result that inequality may be an inverse-U function of investor
protection is awkward to prove analytically, since the sign of the total di¤erential of in-
equality with respect to investor protection depends also on the utility function and the
distribution of ability. Solving the model numerically allows me to easily compute alter-
native measures of inequality, study how they vary with the parameter p, and evaluate
how the risk sharingand the risk takinge¤ects shape this relationship. To this end,
I assume that the utility is logaritmic and the ability distribution is lognormal with mean
and variance taken from the actual distribution of years of schooling for the US, and set
the technological parameters (A, B and ') so as to satisfy the model restrictions.10 Based
on the earnings distributions derived numerically, I compute two indicators of inequality:
the variance and the Gini coe¢ cient. Figure 2 plots the two measures of inequality against
investor protection under di¤erent values of the parameter ', which captures the riskiness
of technology. I solve the model under di¤erent riskiness parameters to generate variation
in risk taking independent of investor protection, and hence to be able to isolate the risk
taking e¤ect.11 Recall that, as predicted by Lemma 2 and Corollary 1, risk taking is
increasing in investor protection (p) and decreasing in technological riskiness. Note also
that nearly all entrepreneurs in the simulation for low risk choose the risky technology
independently of investor protection, so that the risk taking e¤ect is virtually absent
in this case. Figure 2 shows that both the variance and the Gini coe¢ cient of the earn-
ings distribution may be non-monotonic in investor protection. In particular, inequality
is increasing in investor protection when p is su¢ ciently low, and becomes decreasing
when there is enough risk taking. The risk sharing e¤ect is e¤ectively illustrated by
10This numerical solution has no quantitative aim. All details are given in the Appendix.
11Alternatively, I could assume a CRRA utility function and let the risk aversion parameter vary. The
results, available upon request, are analogous.
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the downward-sloping lines for the low-risk technology, which exhibit a sharp decline in
inequality associated to an increase in p when nearly all rms adopt the risky technology
independently of investor protection. The risk takinge¤ect is instead captured by the
initial upward-sloping part of the lines for the middle and high risk cases, and by the
fact that, for any value of p, inequality is higher when the riskiness is lower and hence
risk taking is larger. The analytical results of Proposition 2 and Corollary 3 (inequality
decreases faster with investor protection when risk taking is larger) can be found in Figure
2 by comparing the slope of the declining parts of the lines for di¤erent riskiness at any
level of investor protection: inequality falls more with p, the more risk is taken in the
economy.
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Figure 2: Investor Protection and Income Inequality.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I evaluate empirically the main theoretical predictions derived in section
3. First, I assess the overall e¤ect of investor protection on income inequality. Next, as
a preliminary step to study the mechanism behind this relationship, I address the e¤ect
of investor protection on risk taking predicted by Lemma 2 and Corollary 1. Finally, I
study the di¤erent impact of investor protection on inequality through risk taking and
risk sharing, as predicted by Propositions 1 and 2, and Corollary 2 and 3.
Since investor protection is generally determined by law, it is not expected to exhibit
large variation across geographical areas or sectors within a country. Hence, cross-country
data, possibly with time variation, seem appropriate to evaluate empirically the predictions
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of the model.
4.1 Data
The rst empirical task is to measure the three main variables of interest: inequality,
investor protection and risk taking. I proxy the dependent variable, inequality, with
the Gini coe¢ cient of the income distribution which is a widely used measure and is
available for a relatively large sample of countries and years. I take the data from Dollar
and Kraays (2002) database that relies on four sources: the UN-WIDER World Income
Inequality Database, the high qualitysample from Deininger and Squire (1996), Chen
and Ravallion (2001), and Lundberg and Squire (2000).12 The Gini coe¢ cients I use are
computed over the entire population, while it may be argued that the theory proposed
in the paper refers to entrepreneurs, who are usually in the top percentiles of the income
distribution. This may weaken the empirical evidence in favor of the model, rather than
bias it upwards, if investor protection does not a¤ect the income of the poor through
other channels, or does it reducing inequality. On the other hand, there is evidence
from several countries that a large fraction of the variation in income inequality over
the last two decades is explained by changes at the top of the distribution (see, among
others, Atkinson et al., 2009 and Heathcote et al., 2010). This suggests that the e¤ects of
investor protection on inequality at the top of the distribution are likely to prevail even on
aggregate data for the entire population. Moreover, due to prot sharing, also employees
normally earn higher wages and are subject to higher employment risk when working in
more productive and riskier rms.13 Hence the results obtained for entrepreneurs can be
expected to trickle down to all workers. Alternatively, the model could be reinterpreted in
light of an occupational choice whereby workers face no risk and hence are akin to agents
running safe projects, while entrepreneurs do. Inequality in this case would increase with
the di¤usion of entrepreneurship and decrease with the degree of risk sharing.
I take as a measure of investor protection the index of shareholder protection compiled
by La Porta et al. (2006), that takes values between 0 (no protection) and 10 (maximum
protection). For robustness, I also consider the index of anti directorsself-dealing mea-
12The original sample consists of 953 observations, which reduce to 418 separated by at least ve years,
on 137 countries over the period 1950-1999. Countries di¤er with respect to the survey coverage (national
vs subnational), the welfare measure (income vs expenditure), the measure of income (net vs gross) and the
unit of observation (households vs individuals). For better comparability, data from Deininger and Squire
are usually adjusted by adding 6.6 to the Gini coe¢ cients based on expenditure. Here, the adjustment
was made in a slightly more complicated way to account for the variety of sources; see Dollar and Kraay
(2002) for details.
13Evidence that more productive rms pay higher wages is provided, among others, by Oi and Idson
(1999).
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sures compiled by La Porta et al. (2006) and taking values between 0 (no protection)
and 6 (maximum protection). Both indexes are available for 49 developed and developing
countries and have no time variation, which is their main limitation.
Risk taking in the model stems directly from the threshold ability of the marginal risky
entrepreneur, and is captured by the mass of risky projects undertaken in the economy. Its
ideal empirical counterpart is the possibility for rms to undertake risky projects. It was
shown by the corporate nance literature that a rm that relies more on external equity
relative to debt nance is in a better position to embark in risky projects such as innovation
(see for instance Brown et al., 2009). Moreover, recent empirical evidence by Thesmar
and Thoenig (2009) shows that rms take more risk and have more volatile performance,
the higher the fraction of external equity in their nancial structure. Therefore, I proxy
entrepreneurial risk taking at the aggregate level with the ratio between stock market
capitalization and credit to the private sector. Data for both series, expressed as a share
of GDP are taken from the 2009 update of the database by Beck et al. (2000) on Financial
Development and Structure.
When combining the three data sources for the main dependent and explanatory vari-
ables, I am left with an unbalanced panel of 45 countries observed over the period 1976-
2000.14 Table A reports descriptive statistics for the relevant variables.
4.2 Cross-sectional Estimates
First, I focus on the cross-section of 45 countries and estimate with Ordinary Least Squares
the following equation for the overall e¤ect of investor protection on inequality, as shown
in Figure 2:
Ginii = 0 + 1IPi + 2IPi  IP_highi + 3Xi + i:
The variable Gini is the measure of income inequality, i is the country index, IP is the
indicator of investor protection, IP_high is a dummy taking value 1 if investor protection
is above the sample median (i.e., 4.6) and zero otherwise, X is a vector of control variables,
and  is the error term. Following the empirical literature on income inequality, I include
in X the log of the real per capita GDP and its square, to account for the Kuznets
hypothesis, the share of population above 25 years that completed secondary education
(from Barro and Lee, 2001) to control for education, government expenditure as a ratio
14The countries in the sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Den-
mark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan,
Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.
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of GDP to account for the degree of redistribution, and total trade (Export+Import)
as a ratio of GDP (from the Penn World Tables 6.3). The empirical evidence is in line
with the predictions of the model if the estimates for 1 and 2 are positive and negative
respectively, meaning that inequality rst increases and then falls as investor protection
grows. All variables are expressed in period average for the period 1980-2000.
Table 1 reports the estimated coe¢ cients. In column 1, I only control for investor
protection and education and obtain a non signicant 1, suggesting that there is no clear
correlation. As soon as I allow for non-linearity in investor protection, I obtain signicant
coe¢ cients with the expected sign: positive 1 and negative 2. These results hold if I
control for real GDP per capita and its square, government expenditure and trade over
GDP, in columns 3 and 4. In columns 5 and 6, I replace the indicator of investor protection
IP with the de jure index of anti directorsself dealing measures and obtain analogous,
albeit weaker, results. To correct for a possible simultaneity, in columns 7-9, I take the
last available observation of the Gini coe¢ cient for each country and regress it on the
same variables as in columns 1-3. The estimates are qualitatively and quantitatively very
close to the ones for period averages. These results suggest that the relationship between
investor protection and income inequality is non-monotonic in the way predicted by the
model. Further analysis is needed to assess if the mechanism generating this evidence is
the one proposed in sections 2 and 3.
As a preliminary step to evaluate the empirical relevance of the mechanism proposed in
the model, I test whether investor protection induces entrepreneurial risk taking, which is
the force behind the positive 1 coe¢ cient. To this end, I estimate the following equation:
RTi = a0 + a1IPi + a2Zi + ei; (4)
where RT is the proxy for risk taking, i.e., the ratio of stock market capitalization over
total credit to the private sector, Z is a vector of control variables, and e is the error
term. Data are averaged over the period 1980-2000. Following La Porta et al. (2006), I
include in Z the real per capita GDP and an index of e¢ ciency of the judiciary system
(e¤_jud from La Porta et al., 2006). I rst estimate (4) with OLS and then, to control
for possible endogeneity of investor protection with respect to relative stock market size,
with Two-Stages Least Squares instrumenting investor protection with dummies for UK,
French and German legal origins. The results, reported in Table 2, exhibit positive and
signicant estimates of a1 both with OLS and 2SLS Instrumental Variables. This is in
line both with Corollary 1 and with the evidence in La Porta et al. (2006), and suggests
that indeed entrepreneurial risk taking increases with investor protection. These results
are robust to the use of an alternative measure of investor protection (antidir).
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Testing the main theoretical result that investor protection reduces inequality for a
given degree of risk taking, as stated in the rst part of Corollary 2 and in Corollary 3,
while risk taking tends to increase it for a given level of IP , as proven in the second part
of Corollary 2 and shown in Figure 2, requires regressing the Gini index on IP and the
measure of risk taking. I do this using panel data, which allow me to exploit the additional
information conveyed by the time variation in all variables except the measure of investor
protection.
4.3 Panel Estimates
I exploit the time variation in the data for inequality and risk taking to test the main
prediction of the model by estimating with least squares the following equation:
Giniit = 0 + 1IPi + 2RTit + 3Xit + it; (5)
where time subscripts refer to non-overlapping 5-year periods between 1976 and 2000, all
regressors are the same as described above, and it is the error term. I rst estimate
this equation with random e¤ects, clustering the standard errors by country, which allows
me to characterize the link between investor protection and inequality across countries
over time. A negative estimate for 1 and a positive one for 2 would lend support to
the model prediction that investor protection reduces inequality for a given degree of risk
taking, while risk taking tends to increase it for a given level of IP . Note that four
countries are dropped from the sample since there are no observations for all variables
corresponding to the same ve-year periods.15
The results are reported in Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 replicate the estimates of Table
1 and conrm that inequality is non monotonic in investor protection. Column 3 suggests
that indeed 1 is negative, though not signicant, and 2 positive. Column 4, accounting
both for the non-linearity in IP and RT , conrms that risk taking raises inequality (2
positive), while risk sharing reduces it when investor protection is su¢ ciently high (IP
positive, IP  IP_high negative). In columns 5-7, I study the combined e¤ect of risk
sharing and risk taking by adding to equation (5) the interaction terms RT  IP and,
alternatively, RT  IP_high. In both cases, the table reports a positive 2 and a negative
coe¢ cient for the interaction, meaning that investor protection may reduce inequality
when there is enough risk taking, and that RT has weaker e¤ect on inequality when IP is
high, as predicted by Corollaries 2 and 3 and shown in Figure 2 For robustness check, in
the regressions of Panel B, I replace the investor protection index with the anti directors
15These countries are Hong Kong, Ireland, Switzerland and Uruguay.
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self dealing indicator. The results conrm the evidence in Panel A: improving the degree
of protection of outside shareholders increases inequality by promoting risk taking, but less
so in countries that already have a high degree of investor protection. On the other hand,
more risk taking, independently of whether it is caused by investor protection, increases
inequality.
When I estimate equation (5) with xed e¤ects, the variable IP is dropped from the
estimation, since it has no time variation and cannot be distinguished from the country-
specic component, so that the risk takingand risk sharing channels can no longer
be evaluated separately as before. Hence, I take a di¤erent approach and estimate
Giniit = 0 + 1IPi RTit + 2RTit + 3Xit + i + "it; (6)
where i is the country xed e¤ect, RT alone accounts for risk taking, and the interaction
term captures the di¤erential e¤ect it has in countries with better investor protection. A
negative 1 and a positive 2 would lend support to the model prediction, since they would
imply that risk taking, regardless of what generates it, increases income inequality, but
less so where investor protection is high since it provides better risk sharing.
Table 4 reports the results obtained both with random and xed e¤ects. The estimates
for 1 and 2 have the expected negative and positive signs throughout all specications
and lend support to the mechanism proposed in sections 2 and 3. The results appear
stronger when country xed e¤ects are accounted for and when the interaction is set
between RT and the dummy for high IP , suggesting that the risk-sharing e¤ect becomes
relevant for high enough degrees of investor protection.
For robustness check, in the regressions of Panel B, I replace the investor protection
index with the anti directorsself dealing indicator. Also in this case, the results conrm
the evidence in Panel A.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides theoretical and empirical support for a systematic relationship be-
tween investor protection and income inequality through nancial risk sharing and en-
trepreneurial risk taking. While there are contributions addressing the e¤ects of investor
protection on nancial structure, risk sharing and economic growth, no attention has been
paid to the implications for income distribution. To ll this gap, I develop a simple sta-
tic model with risk-averse agents, heterogeneous in their ability, that can produce using
either a safe or a risky technology. I assume that entrepreneurs have to borrow funds
in order to start their business, and that there are nancial frictions, arising from the
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non-observability of a rms cash-ow to investors.
In this framework, I study how investor protection, by alleviating frictions, a¤ects
optimal nancial contracts, the technological choice of agents with di¤erent ability and
the distribution of their earnings. Better investor protection a¤ects income inequality in
two opposite ways. By improving risk sharing between entrepreneurs and nanciers, it
reduces income volatility for a given mass of risky rms. On the other hand, by inducing
more agents to choose the risky technology, it increases the dispersion of the earnings
realizations. The rst, risk sharing, e¤ect tends to reduce inequality, while risk taking
raises it. The overall impact of investor protection on inequality is shown to be non-
monotonic. In particular, the risk taking e¤ect dominates at low levels of investor
protection, and is outweighed by risk sharingwhen investor protection is high. In the
empirical section, I provide evidence from a panel of forty-ve countries over the period
1976-2000 that is consistent with the main theoretical predictions.
The model is deliberately kept simple to emphasize the mechanism linking investor
protection to income inequality. It follows that its implications for economic performance
and welfare may appear simplistic: aggregate income increases with investor protection
due to risk taking, and welfare increases due to higher output and better risk sharing.
Yet, an interesting insight is that investor protection, through its positive e¤ect on ag-
gregate output and the non-monotonic impact on inequality, generates a Kuznetscurve.
Contrary to existing models, this inverse-U shaped relationship between GDP and in-
equality is generated by the development of nancial institutions, rather than by wealth
accumulation.
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A Proofs
Lemma 1
The assumptions that A > B + 1 > 'A and u0 > 0, imply that agents with  = 1
always choose the risky technology since V R(1) = u(wH (1)) = u(A   1) > u (B) = V S ;
while agents with  = 0 always make the safe choice since V R(0) = u(wL (0)) = u('A 
1) < V S . To prove that there exist a unique ability  2 (0; 1) such that V R() < (>)
V S for all  > (<) , I just need to show that V R is increasing in . The derivative of
V R w. r. t.  under the optimal nancial contract is
@V R
@
= u
 
wH ()
  u  wL ()+ p (1  ')A u0  wH ()+ (1  )u0  wL () > 0
since wH () > wL (). Therefore, there exist a unique threshold ability  such that
V R () = V S and 8 > ; u  wH ()+ (1  )u  wL () > u (B).
Lemma 2
To prove that the threshold ability is decreasing in investor protection, I characterize
 as implicit function of p,
V R (; p) = V S ;
and obtain its derivative with respect to p as
@
@p
=  @V
R
@p

@V R
@
 1
:
To prove that this derivative is negative, I just need to show that @V
R
@p is positive, since
by Lemma 1 @V
R
@ > 0. I obtain
@V R
@p
= u0
 
wH ()
 @wH
@p
+ (1  )u0  wL () @wL
@p
=  (1  ) u0  wL ()  u0  wH () (1  ')A  0;
since utility is concave and wL ()  wH (). It follows that @@p  0, with limp!1
@
@p = 0
since lim
p!1
wH () = lim
p!1
wL () = wS and lim
p!0
@
@p =  1 since limp!0u
0  wL () = 1.
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The threshold ability varies with the technological parameters A, ' and B as follows
@
@A
=  @V
R
@A

@V R
@
 1
< 0
@
@'
=  @V
R
@'

@V R
@
 1
< 0
@
@B
=
@V S
@B

@V R
@
 1
> 0
since
@V Rt
@A
= u0
 
wHit
 @wH
@A
+ (1  )u0  wLit @wL@A
= u0
 
wHit

['+ p (1  ') + (1  p) (1  ')]
+ (1  )u0  wLit ['+ p (1  ')] > 0;
@V Rt
@'
= u0
 
wHit
 @wH
@'
+ (1  )u0  wLit @wL@'
= (1  )u0  wHit Ap + (1  )u0  wLitA (1  p) > 0
and
@V St
@B
= u0 (B   1) > 0:
Corollary 1
The derivative of  w.r.t.  is
@
@
=  g ()  0:
The derivative of  w.r.t. ' is
@
@'
=
@
@'
@
@
 0
since @

@' < 0 by Lemma 2.
The derivative of  w.r.t. B is
@
@B
=
@
@B
@
@
 0
since @

@B > 0 by Lemma 2.
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The derivative of  w.r.t. p is
@
@p
=
@
@p
@
@
 0
since @

@p < 0 by Lemma 2.
The derivative of  w.r.t. A is
@
@A
=
@
@A
@
@
 0
since @

@A < 0 by Lemma 2.
Proposition 1
The partial derivative of ! w.r.t. p, holding  constant, is
@!
@p


=  !2
 (1  ')A
A  1  0:
The partial derivative of ! w.r.t. , holding everything else constant, is
@!
@

p
=  !2 p (1  ')A
A  1  0:
Corollary 2
The rst part follows from Proposition 1 and Corollary 1.
The second part is easily proved by obtaining the derivative of ! w.r.t. :
d!
d

p
=
@!
@

p
,
@
@
:
The rst term is positive by Proposition 1 and the second is negative by Corollary 1.
Lemma 3
The derivative of average entrepreneurial earnings w.r.t.  is
@E [w]
@
= rg ()

wS   wH ()  (1  )wL () :
This is non positive since, by risk aversion and the denition of , wS  wH ()  
(1  )wL ().
Proposition 2
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The partial derivative of V ar (w) w.r.t. p is
@V ar
@p
=
Z 1


2
 
wH   E [w] @wH
@p
+ 2 (1  )  wL   E [w] @wL
@p

g () d
=
Z 1


2wH
@wH
@p
+ 2 (1  )wL@w
L
@p

g () d;
which becomes, after simplifying and replacing for wH , wL, @w
H
@p =   (1  ) (1  ')A
and @w
L
@p =  (1  ')A,
@V ar
@p
=  2 (1  p) (1  ')2A2
Z 1

 (1  ) g () d  0:
To prove that this derivative is higher the higher is the threshold ability , I obtain
the derivative of @V ar (w) =@p w.r.t.  and show that it is positive:
@

@V ar
@p

@
= 2 (1  p) (1  ')2A2 (1  ) g ()  0:
Corollary 3
The rst part follows from Proposition 2 and Corollary 1.
The second part is easily proved by obtaining the derivative of V ar (w) w.r.t. :
dV ar
d

p
=
@V ar
@

p
,
@
@
 0
since the rst term is positive by Proposition 1 and the second one negative by Corollary
1.
B Simulation details
This section describes step by step the procedure I followed for solving numerically the
model of sections 2 and 3
1. Set values for the main parameters: A=4; B=2; '=[0.251 0.3 0.46], r=1.
2. Compute values for the parameters of the Lognormal distribution of abilities, (; ),
from Barro and Lees (2000) data. The database provides observations for the per-
centages of the population aged 15 and above with no, primary, secondary and
tertiary education (lu, lp, ls, lh), along with the average year of each education level
(pyr, syr, hyr). I compute the average years of schooling for people with primary,
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secondary and tertiary education (q1, q2, q3, respectively):
q1 =
pyr
lp+ ls+ lh
; q2 = q1 +
syr
ls+ lh
; q3 = q1 + q2 +
hyr
lh
:
The average years of schooling and their variance are then
E (Q) =
3X
i=1
liqi
V (Q) =
3X
i=0
li (qi   E (Q))2 ;
with l0 = lu, l1 = lp, l2 = ls and l3 = lh. Finally,  and  can be derived from the
expressions for mean and variance of the Lognormal distribution:
E (Q) = e+
2
2
V (Q) = e2+2
2   e+2 :
3. For each value of ', compute the threshold ability with perfect investor protection 
p=1

.
(a) Dene a grid of 101 degrees of investor protection p 2 [0; 1], and a grid of initial
guesses for the threshold ability  2 p=1; 1, equally spaced by 0.00005 (the
ner the grid, the better the approximation).
(b) Draw  =100001 ability levels from a Lognormal (; ) and sort them in ascend-
ing order. Identify the ability level :999 : G (:999) = 0:999 and divide every
  :999 by this gure. Replace all  > :999 by 1, so that the distribution is
normalized to values included in [0; 1], and truncated in a way that makes the
top 0.1 per cent of the population successful with certainty. Compute the Cdf
of ability,
G (i) =
# of realizations   i

:
(c) For each degree of investor protection p
i. compute  (p) as the solution to the technology choice problem. In par-
ticular, recursively nd the point in the grid of  satisfying:
log (B   r) =  log  wH ()+ (1  ) log  wL ()
with wH () and wL () dened by (1) and (2)
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ii. for every ability 
A. draw the earning realization:
w =
(
B   r
A [p (1  ') + '+ (1  p) (1  ') ]  r
 < 
  
  Bi (N;) , with N = # of   :
B. sort w and derive its cumulative density function as F (wi) =
# of realizations wwi

C. compute the variance of
D. compute the Lorenz Curve as L (wm) =
mean of wwm
mean of w
m
 form = 1; 2; :::
E. compute the Gini coe¢ cient as Gini = 1  2Pm=1 L(wm)
iii. save the threshold, the variance and the Gini in (1 p) vectors,  (p),
V ar(w(p)), and Gini(p)
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Table A. Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Gini 37.489 8.487 26.569 58.254 
Investor Protection 4.610 2.716 0 10 
Risk Taking 0.676 0.358 0.037 1.571 
Log(Real p.c. GDP) 9.347 0.835 7.562 10.361 
Schooling 27.513 16.024 1.55 71.725 
Gov't 
expenditure/GDP 0.062 0.053 0.015 0.329 
Trade/GDP 0.158 0.072 0.043 0.494 
 
 
Table 1. Investor Protection and Income Inequality 
Cross-section, 1980-2000, OLS 
Dep. variable: Gini_8000 Gini_8000 Gini_8000 Gini_8000 Gini_8000 Gini_8000 Gini_last Gini_last Gini_last 
          
Investor protection (IP) 0.174 1.690* 2.140** 1.976**   0.232 1.807* 2.047** 
 [0.472] [0.893] [0.791] [0.834]   [0.511] [0.982] [0.965] 
IP*IP_high  -1.266* -1.397** -1.327**    -1.316* -1.336* 
  [0.659] [0.642] [0.628]    [0.755] [0.757] 
Antidir (AD)     0.809 3.028*    
     [1.000] [1.653]    
AD*AD_high      -1.592    
      [1.036]    
Schooling -0.259*** -0.255*** -0.083 -0.05 -0.262*** -0.255*** -0.281*** -0.276*** -0.022 
 [0.077] [0.071] [0.091] [0.109] [0.075] [0.074] [0.094] [0.091] [0.133] 
log(Real GDP p.c.)   114.792** 120.132**     140.146*** 
   [47.418] [46.003]     [46.254] 
log(Real GDP p.c.)^2   -6.520** -6.863***     -8.031*** 
   [2.597] [2.513]     [2.522] 
Gov't expenditure/GDP    3.467     3.690 
    [14.379]     [17.935] 
Trade/GDP    -16.495     -25.578* 
    [12.936]     [14.864] 
Observations 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
R-squared 0.228 0.279 0.477 0.494 0.241 0.284 0.205 0.248 0.487 
 
Note: dipendent variable is the Gini coefficient of the income distribution, expressed in period average (Gini_8000) and in the last available 
observation (Gini_last). Among the regressors, Investor Protection is a de jure index scaled from 0 to 10, IP_high is a dummy for investor 
protection higher than the median, Antidir is a de jure index of anti directors' self dealing measures scaled between 0 and 6, AD_high is a 
dummy for Antidir higher than 3, Schooling is percentage of population aged above 25 years with completed secondary education, Trade 
is Import+Export. All regressors are expressed in period average. Regressions are performed with OLS. Robust standard errors are 
reported in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level of confidence. 
 
Table 2. Investor Protection and Risk Taking 
Cross-section, 1980-2000 
 Risk 
Taking 
Investor 
protection 
Risk 
Taking 
Risk 
Taking 
Antidir Risk 
Taking 
       
Investor protection 0.058***  0.064**    
 [0.021]  [0.028]    
Antidir    0.079*  0.141** 
    [0.043]  [0.066] 
log(Real GDP p.c.) -0.045 0.187 -0.038 -0.064 0.025 -0.027 
 [0.070] [0.579] [0.084] [0.071] [0.307] [0.094] 
Efficiency judiciary 0.053 0.091 0.048 0.067* 0.042 0.047 
 [0.033] [0.252] [.036] [0.034] [0.134] [0.039] 
UK legal origin  2.652**   1.223*  
  [1.205]   [0.638]  
French legal origin  -1.272   -0.583  
  [1.272]   [0.675]  
German legal origin -1.354   -0.749  
  [1.389]   [0.736]  
Observations 45 45 45 45 45 45 
R-squared 0.326 0.497 0.324 0.241 0.433 0.192 
Estimation OLS 2SLS - first 2SLS - 
second 
OLS 2SLS - first 2SLS - 
second 
F-test  9.13   7.15  
[p-value]  [0.000]   [0.001]  
Sargan test  3.28   2.41  
[p-value]  [0.190]   [0.300]  
 
Note. The dependent variable is risk taking, proxied by stock market capitalization as a ratio 
of total credit to the private sector, in columns 1, 3, 4 and 6; the index of investor protection 
(scaled from 0 to 10) in column 2; and the anti directors' self-dealing measures (Antidir, 
scaled from 0 to 6) in column 5. Among the regressors, Efficiency of the judiciary is a de jure 
index scaled from 0 to 10; UK, French and German legal origins are dummies. All variables 
are expressed in period average. OLS estimates in columns 1 and 4, 2SLS instrumental 
variable estimates in columns 2-3 and 5-6. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level of confidence. 
 
 
Table 3. Investor Protection, Risk Taking and Income Inequality 
Panel, 1976-2000, Random Effects 
Panel A. Investor Protection (IP) 
Investor protection (IP) 0.096 1.884* -0.077 1.692* 0.339 0.405 0.548 
 [0.511] [1.018] [0.482] [0.915] [0.488] [0.455] [0.456] 
IP*IP_high  -1.479*  -1.466**    
  [0.796]  [0.721]    
Risk Taking (RT)   3.873*** 3.932*** 8.256*** 6.963*** 8.261*** 
   [1.350] [1.373] [2.256] [2.577] [2.114] 
RT*IP     -0.776** -0.626  
     [0.375] [0.446]  
RT*IP_high       -6.289*** 
       [2.374] 
Schooling -17.917*** -17.472*** -20.980*** -20.505*** -21.340*** -12.516** -13.590** 
 [4.855] [4.767] [4.603] [4.505] [4.637] [5.960] [6.055] 
log(Real GDP p.c.)      52.308** 48.474** 
      [23.726] [22.935] 
log(Real GDP p.c.) squared      -3.092** -2.865** 
      [1.343] [1.301] 
Gov't expenditure/GDP      -7.102 -7.146 
      [9.058] [9.274] 
Trade/GDP      -0.845 -0.944 
      [1.613] [1.570] 
Observations 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 
Countries 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
R-squared 0.166 0.188 0.279 0.306 0.27 0.419 0.45 
 
Note: All observations refer to non-overlapping 5-year periods. Dependent variable is the Gini coefficient of the income 
distribution observed in the last available year. Regressors, defined in Tables 1 and 2, are period averages. Regressions 
are performed with Least Squares. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 
and 10 per cent level of confidence. 
 
 
Table 3. Investor Protection, Risk Taking and Income Inequality 
Panel, 1976-2000, Random Effects 
Panel B. Anti Directors' self dealing (AD) 
Antidir (AD) 0.782 2.986* -0.532 2.873* 1.782 1.902* 1.647 
 [0.978] [1.800] [1.002] [1.618] [1.202] [1.117] [1.065] 
AD*AD_high  -1.611  -1.770    
  [1.207]  [1.105]    
Risk Taking (RT)   3.767*** 3.932*** 11.344*** 10.548*** 6.059*** 
   [1.372] [1.438] [2.580] [2.708] [2.041] 
RT*AD     -2.220*** -2.117**  
     [0.804] [0.869]  
RT*AD_high       -5.437* 
       [2.795] 
Schooling -18.324*** -18.087*** -21.317*** -21.232*** -22.506*** -14.672** -15.355*** 
 [4.980] [4.941] [4.689] [4.671] [4.750] [5.791] [5.760] 
log(Real GDP p.c.)      56.284** 53.173** 
      [23.435] [23.017] 
log(Real GDP p.c.) squared      -3.292** -3.105** 
      [1.317] [1.294] 
Gov't expenditure/GDP      -5.918 -6.082 
      [9.380] [9.053] 
Trade/GDP      -1.152 -0.549 
      [1.509] [1.630] 
Observations 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 
Countries 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
R-squared 0.151 0.155 0.26 0.279 0.228 0.408 0.403 
 
Note: All observations refer to non-overlapping 5-year periods. Dependent variable is the Gini coefficient of the income 
distribution observed in the last available year. Regressors, defined in Tables 1 and 2, are period averages. Regressions 
are performed with Least Squares. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 
and 10 per cent level of confidence. 
 
 
Table 4. Risk Taking, Risk Sharing and Income Inequality 
Panel, 1976-2000, Fixed and Random Effects 
Panel A. Investor Protection (IP) 
Risk Taking (RT) 7.531*** 7.549*** 5.981** 7.060*** 7.586*** 7.128*** 
 [2.477] [2.234] [2.769] [2.438] [2.080] [2.237] 
RT*IP -0.633 -0.822** -0.414 -0.861**   
 [0.393] [0.338] [0.443] [0.360]   
RT*IP_high     -4.991** -6.205** 
     [2.211] [2.525] 
Schooling -20.830*** -15.906*** -11.389* -16.392** -12.052* -15.818* 
 [4.762] [5.436] [6.035] [7.803] [6.181] [8.011] 
log(Real GDP p.c.)   48.419** 4.115 43.240* -6.221 
   [22.441] [23.804] [22.073] [24.089] 
log(Real GDP p.c.) squared   -2.884** -0.348 -2.585** 0.23 
   [1.279] [1.429] [1.260] [1.443] 
Gov't expenditure/GDP   -7.143 -0.725 -7.503 1.184 
   [8.925] [9.284] [9.085] [9.491] 
Trade/GDP   -0.902 5.067 -0.937 4.463 
   [1.556] [3.647] [1.518] [3.516] 
Observations 85 85 85 85 85 85 
Countries 41 41 41 41 41 41 
R-squared 0.277 0.203 0.421 0.234 0.44 0.269 
Country FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Panel B. Anti Directors' self dealing (AD) 
Risk Taking (RT) 9.301*** 11.236*** 8.005*** 10.468*** 5.580*** 5.559*** 
 [2.359] [2.703] [2.470] [2.627] [1.937] [1.508] 
RT*AD -1.577** -2.415*** -1.238* -2.328***   
 [0.703] [0.857] [0.731] [0.860]   
RT*AD_high     -3.594 -6.021** 
     [2.300] [2.408] 
Schooling -21.380*** -17.799*** -12.487** -17.084** -13.217** -17.045** 
 [4.729] [5.244] [5.917] [7.466] [5.866] [7.522] 
log(Real GDP p.c.)   47.146** 8.608 45.866** 5.482 
   [21.997] [22.425] [21.861] [24.076] 
log(Real GDP p.c.) squared   -2.804** -0.569 -2.721** -0.405 
   [1.253] [1.326] [1.245] [1.429] 
Gov't expenditure/GDP   -7.021 1.135 -7.129 0.283 
   [9.053] [9.083] [8.852] [9.224] 
Trade/GDP   -1.354 2.860 -0.976 3.520 
   [1.415] [2.474] [1.511] [2.776] 
Observations 85 85 85 85 85 85 
Countries 41 41 41 41 41 41 
R-squared 0.243 0.295 0.399 0.307 0.398 0.294 
Country FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Note: All observations refer to non-overlapping 5-year periods. Dependent variable is the Gini coefficient of the income 
distribution observed in the last available year. Regressors, defined in Tables 1 and 2, are period averages. Regressions 
are performed with Least Squares. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 
and 10 per cent level of confidence. 
